Girolamo Imbruglia (Istituto Universitario Orientae Napoli)
Resentment between the theory of rights of man and the history of societies: Diderot and the Histoire des Deux Indes
In the Encyclopédie, Diderot showed that the origins of natural rights were in human passions and not in their silence, which, according to Rousseau brought forth reason and therefore the natural right. Among these passions a very important role was acknowledged by the philosophe to the passions of resentment and indignation [indignation and ressentiment] (see Diderot’s DROIT NATUREL). Against both Rousseau and Hobbes, Diderot chose to follow some important anthropological suggestions by Shaftesbury, who had emphasized this passion. Therefore, in many items of the Encyclopédie Diderot developed them towards a new theory of human natural rights and towards a new and original reconstruction of their genesis and of their political histories, from the despotic theocracy to Roman republic, to French monarchy.
This argument underwent further elaboration especially in Principes de politique des souverains and in Pages contre un tyran. In this cluster of themes it is possible to see the source of the theory of the three codes; but also it became an important tool in Diderot’s analysis of contemporary societies in the Histoire des Deux Indes.
In the Histoire des Deux Indes indignation and resentment were acknowledged as characteristics of the philosophe himself [«Jusqu'à présent, je me suis si fréquemment livré aux mouvemens de l'indignation que j'ai pensé que l'on me pardonneroit une fois d'avoir pris l'arme du ridicule et de l'ironie, qui a si souvent tranché les nœuds les plus importans. Je rentre dans le ton qui me convient» (H80, XIX, 10, IV, p. 655)]. The «conseils» which the philosophe «s’opiniâtre d’adresser aux nations et à ceux qui les gouvernent» have indeed the purpose of bringing forth «l’indignation publique» (III, XI, 20, p. 166), which is the very condition of individual and social freedom (IX, XIX, 12, p. 679).
But in its descriptions of ancient and modern societies the Histoire des Deux Indes uncovers a much greater number of nations from which the indignation had disappeared and consequently where political and civil freedom was absent: in Oriental societies (I, II, 35, p. 373), in American (III, VII, 5, p. 137), and European societies (IV, XVI, 11, p. 123) as well. All these are despotic societies. In this way the category of resentement has two important results, in order to understand the history of both the European and non European societies. First, Diderot gives now a new theory of despotism. Partially, his concept of despotism has corrected Montesquieu’s perspective, because there are now two principles to explain despotism: the fear and the lack of resentment, autrement dit, the principle of voluntary servitude (servitude volontaire).
Secondly, the category of resentment represents not only a concept apt to describe the despotic society, but also a concept apt to criticize it and to bring forth an alternative ideal. Indignation and resentment are the structures of public opinion in the free societies (IV, XVIII, 35, pp. 365-6). The difficulty of freedom is therefore that of maintaining the dynamics of resentment but, at the same time, to have institution able to guarantee civil order and political liberty.
