CRASSH

Our course is designed to meet two objectives. First, we aim to describe and evaluate the extent to which work in each of the two disciplines can both be informed by, and open to further illumination from, work in the other. Second, we aim to produce enough in-depth illumination of work from each discipline in order for description and evaluation to be meaningful. In order to meet both of these objectives the course will be in two parts. The first part (weeks 1-4) will focus on one particular strand of recent moral philosophy that makes explicit connections to work in social anthropology. The second part (weeks 5-8) will focus on one particular strand of social anthropology that makes explicit connections to work in moral philosophy. Each part of the course will include three sessions (seminars 1-3 and 5-7) in which the work of one specific contributor to the relevant strand of research is subjected to in-depth study. Each seminar in the series will begin with a summary presentation followed by structured discussion. The final session of each part of the course (seminars 4 and 8) will be devoted to general discussion of the relevant strand of research, initiated by a critical presentation by both of the course leaders on the work considered over the previous three seminars, from the perspective of social anthropology and moral philosophy respectively. This will then be followed by open discussion.

Part One of the course will focus on one particular strand of recent moral philosophy that makes explicit connections to work in social anthropology. This is a strand of moral psychology that takes as its starting point a methodological principle of ‘philosophical naturalism’ and aims to give an account of the nature and objective aspirations of moral thought in terms of its contingently evolved social and psychological functions. In recent years, a number of prominent philosophers in this tradition have produced influential work pertaining to the nature of moral agency, moral character and moral judgement along these lines in the course of defending a broadly ‘Humean’ account of our moral sensibility. Among these scholars are included Richard Joyce, David Wong and Jesse Prinz. These scholars make explicit connection to recent work in social anthropology in order to bolster or elaborate their arguments. The aim of the first part of the course is to explore these connections and evaluate the philosophical accounts in question from a perspective that takes both philosophical and anthropological theory into account.

Part Two of the course will focus on one particular strand of recent social anthropology that makes explicit use of work in moral philosophy. This is a strand of anthropological theory that takes as its starting point the interpretative framework of socially situated ‘virtue theory’ associated with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and others, and which aims to give an account of religious and other social practices by interpreting their participants as engaged in projects for the cultivation of virtues, where those virtues and the forms of self-­fashioning through which they are developed are specific to historically and culturally particular traditions. In recent years, a number of prominent social anthropologists in this tradition have produced influential work along these lines. Among these scholars are Michael Lambek, Saba Mahmood and Anand Pandian. These scholars make explicit applications of philosophical theory in order to develop their ethnographic interpretations. The aim of the second part of the course is to explore these applications and evaluate the anthropological accounts in question from a perspective that takes both anthropological and philosophical theory into account.

Assessment  

We will offer a formal assessment for students taking the course that will take a form of a short essay, written at the end of the course and on a question chosen from a list of topics supplied by us. Students assessed in this way will receive written certification for inclusion in their research/teaching portfolio.