



## CRASSH Research Publication No. 1

# Conspiracy and Collective Action: Between the hidden hand and the invisible hand

---

Alfred Moore<sup>\*</sup>

**Keywords:** Conspiracy; Politics; Social Anthropology

*Presented to the annual conference of the European Association of Social Anthropology, Tallinn, Estonia, 31 Aug - 3 Sept 2014.*

*Published 14 July 2015*

### Abstract

It is common to observe that both conspiracy theories and more respectable forms of social and political critique work by giving an account of what lies beneath the surface of political reality. Yet it is also common to distinguish them by pointing to the sorts of hidden forces they reveal: conspiracy theorists find malign human agency where more thoughtful critics find impersonal social forces. However, in this paper I argue that we should be wary of setting up a dichotomy between ‘hidden hand’ and ‘invisible hand’ explanations because it overshadows and obscures the variety of forms of collective action that lie between them. If we want a better grasp of the ubiquity of the language of conspiracy in political and social life, and the problematic category of conspiracy theories, we need a clearer account of the spectrum of forms of secret or obscure co-ordination of collective action. To this end I will make a distinction between conspiracy and collusion, and highlight the ways in which both are distinguished from invisible hand theories. I will illustrate this distinction with a discussion of claims of conspiracy and conspiracy theory in political debates on climate change. In conclusion, I will suggest that what is often called conspiracy theory is not about a ‘hidden hand’ so much as it is about revealing unwitting complicity in co-ordinated collective action.

---

<sup>\*</sup> Dr Alfred Moore, Research Fellow, CRASSH  
University of Cambridge [am2214@cam.ac.uk](mailto:am2214@cam.ac.uk)

## Conspiracy and Collective Action: Between the hidden hand and the invisible hand

Conspiracy theories have in recent years become a matter of rising public and academic concern. They have been variously linked to a crisis of trust in government, to the undermining of democratic deliberation, and a weakening the state's capacity to govern.<sup>1</sup> Recent work in psychology, political science and policy studies has paid close attention to the causes (and in one prominent case, the cures<sup>2</sup>) of belief in conspiracy theories, the psychological origins and character of 'conspiracist ideation', and the social and partisan distribution of belief in conspiracy theories.<sup>3</sup> This body of work is giving us a much more detailed picture of who believes in which conspiracy theories and when and why they are likely to do so. However, there has been in this line of political research relatively little critical reflection on the concept of conspiracy theory itself. In this paper I aim to contribute to this more critical project by focusing not on belief in conspiracy theories but in the ways we might

---

<sup>1</sup> '[C]onspiracy theories drive a wedge between governments and particular communities... [and] demolish the mutuality and trust that people have in institutions of government,' Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, *The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism* (London: Demos, 2010), 5. Conspiracy theories 'can have pernicious effects from the government's point of view, either by inducing unjustifiably widespread public skepticism about the government's assertions, or by dampening public mobilisation and participation in government-led efforts, or both,' Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, 'Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures\*,' *Journal of Political Philosophy* (2009): 220. '[C]onspiracy theorizing is not confined to parlor games about who really shot JFK or who probed whom near Roswell, New Mexico. Conspiracy theories have been deeply entwined in revolutions, social movements, and public policy and they have fueled political stalemate, alienation, witch-hunts, and worse' (Joseph Uscinski and Joseph Parent, *American Conspiracy Theories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4. 'Conspiracy thinking has moved Americans beyond a healthy skepticism of authority. Lacking public confidence, core institutions become unstable and lose their ability to govern. The cancer of conspiracism has begun to metastasize. Without a new awareness of its character and a quick intervention, countersubversion may overcome the body politic,' Robert Alan Goldberg, *Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 260. 'If large numbers of people within a democracy distrust their leaders and fear that the system is being manipulated by secret groups or organizations, democracy itself becomes threatened,' Donald T. Critchlow, John Korasick, and Matthew C. Sherman, eds., *Political Conspiracies in America* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2008), xi.

<sup>2</sup> Sunstein and Vermeule, 'Conspiracy Theories.'

<sup>3</sup> Uscinski and Parent, *American Conspiracy Theories*.

conceptualise conspiracy itself. That is, rather than ask ‘Why do people believe in conspiracy theories?’, this paper addresses the question: ‘How do people think about conspiracies?’

A conspiracy involves an explicit agreement among two or more people to do something that is illegal or that they could not publicly avow. A conspiracy theory, then, involves an attempt to explain some event or process in terms of a conspiracy, that is, in terms of a group of persons co-ordinating in secret to realise a purpose that they could not publicly avow.<sup>4</sup> This definition, or some variation on it, is quite widely shared. But it often conflates the dimensions of agreement and co-ordinated action. The conspiracy, strictly speaking, is an agreement. The co-ordinated action that follows, if it’s secret, is collusion. Yet in the way in which we talk about conspiracy *theory* this distinction is less clear. And this is because unmasking a conspiracy doesn’t just involve un-masking a literal secret agreement. It also involves unmasking collusion, a kind of co-ordinated collective action characterised by a *tacit* agreement.

This paper focuses on the mode of collective action involved in conspiracy itself. I suggest that we think in terms of a spectrum of degrees of co-ordination of collective action, which in turn involves degrees of intention and agreement. This in itself marks a departure from the highly influential approach of Karl Popper in *The Open Society and its Enemies*. Popper framed a stark dichotomy between a ‘conspiracy theory of society’, characterised by a search for hidden agents and hidden intentions to explain complex social and political phenomena, and an invisible hand theory of society, in which complex social and political phenomena emerge from the interactions of many agents, none of whom intends or foresees that outcome. In the space between these two extremes there is a wide range of intermediary forms. I describe one such form, collusion, as an association bound in a common interest against a wider public interest

---

<sup>4</sup> This is a fairly standard definition of conspiracy and conspiracy theory. Keeley, for instance, defines a conspiracy theory as ‘a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons - the conspirators - acting in secret,’ Brian Keeley, ‘Of Conspiracy Theories,’ *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1999): 116.

by a tacit, and therefore hidden, agreement. Collusion is particularly important because, while it seems to involve a conspiracy without conspirators (in the sense of plotters), it also does useful work in describing the sorts of things that people accused of being conspiracy theorists are supposed to believe. In the latter sections of the paper I discuss the climate change debates as a way to illustrate the distinction between different degrees of conspiratorial co-ordination, and to show its value in discussing claims about conspiracy and conspiracy theory. This approach suggests not only that conspiracy theorising is a spectrum disorder. It also suggests that accusations of conspiracy may serve to reveal not only secret plots hatched in smoky rooms, but also unwitting complicity in the production of collective action. This approach also contributes to the widely observed affinity between conspiracy theories and more respectable forms of social and political critique, which is where I will begin.

## 1. Conspiracy and Critique

In a 2004 essay called *Has Critique Run Out of Steam?*<sup>5</sup> Bruno Latour drew an interesting parallel between conspiracy theories and critical theories. ‘Let me be mean for a second’, he wrote. ‘What’s the real difference between conspiracists and a popularised... version of social critique?’

‘In both cases, you have to learn to become suspicious of everything people say because of course we all know that they live in the thralls of a complete *illusio* of their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an explanation is requested for what is really going on, in both cases again it is the same appeal to powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we in the academy like to use more elevated causes – society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism – while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I find something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and,

---

<sup>5</sup> Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,’ *Critical Inquiry* 30 (2004): 228. From the Stanford presidential lecture he gave at the Stanford Humanities Center, 7 Apr. 2003.

then, in the wheeling of causal explanations coming out of the deep dark below. ... Maybe I am taking conspiracy theories too seriously, but it worries me to detect, in those mad mixtures of knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation from the social neverland many of the weapons of social critique.<sup>6</sup>

Latour has a point. There does seem to be a similarity in the structure of conspiracy theories – ‘the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal explanations coming out of the deep dark below’ – and forms of what we might in the most general sense call, with Latour, ‘social critique’.<sup>7</sup>

Most definitions of conspiracy theories emphasise that they account for some undesired event or process in terms of the causal agency of a small group acting in secret.<sup>8</sup> Unpacking this common definition, I take it that what we ordinarily call conspiracy theories involve three things. First, they involve a putative conspiracy, which is to say, a group of persons co-ordinating in secret with the aim of realising some malevolent purpose. Second, they involve a group of people who are supposedly being conspired against, yet who are of course unaware of the conspiracy. Third, they involve one or more privileged observers, who can recognise the conspiracy, and who aim to share that knowledge with others. Conspiracy theories claim to be forms of knowledge, that is, they claim to explain what really happened.<sup>9</sup> But that is not all they do.

---

<sup>6</sup> Latour, ‘Critique,’ 229-30.

<sup>7</sup> For an illuminating discussion of the variety of ways in which sociological theory has distanced itself from the figure of conspiracy theory, see Luc Boltanski, *Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, Spy Novels, and the Making of Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 234-248.

<sup>8</sup> See Keeley, ‘Of Conspiracies,’ 116. For an excellent critical overview of the different attempts to pin down the meaning of ‘conspiracy theory’ see Peter Knight’s introduction to his encyclopaedia of American conspiracy theories, Peter Knight, *Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopaedia. 2 vols* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 15-24.

<sup>9</sup> Conspiracy theories typically provide neither mystical accounts of events nor literary fictions. They claim to reveal something about the causes of events. A conspiracy theory is a narrative that claims to explain what really happened. See Volker Heins, ‘Critical Theory and the Traps of Conspiracy Thinking,’ *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 33 (2007): 787-801, and Cornel Zwierlein, ‘Security Politics and Conspiracy Theories in the Emerging European State

One crucial point in this initial account of conspiracy theories is that they address not only a malicious plot, but also an attempt to *deceive the public* about the real motives behind some account of events. A conspiracy requires secrecy; a conspiracy *theory* requires publicity. It addresses an actual public audience.

In the most general sense, the similarity to more respectable forms of social critique is in their reliance on unmasking. They aim not simply to *refute* particular claims, but to *unmask* them. This point was most strongly emphasized by Karl Mannheim, in his sociology of knowledge. 'The unmasking turn of mind', Mannheim wrote, is

'a turn of mind which does not seek to refute, negate, or call in doubt certain ideas, but rather to disintegrate them, and that in such a way that the whole world outlook of a social stratum becomes disintegrated at the same time. We must pay attention, at this point, to the phenomenological distinction between 'denying the truth' of an idea, and 'determining the function' it exercises. In denying the truth of an idea, I still presuppose it as 'thesis' and thus put myself upon the same theoretical (and nothing more than theoretical) basis as the one on which the idea is constituted. In casting doubt upon the 'idea', I still think within the same categorical pattern as the one in which it has its being. But when I do not even raise the question (or at least when I do not make this question the burden of my argument) whether what the idea asserts is true, but consider it merely in terms of the extra-theoretical function it serves, then, and only then, do I achieve an 'unmasking' which in fact represents no theoretical refutation but the destruction of the practical effectiveness of these ideas.'<sup>10</sup>

---

System (15th/16th c.),' in Historical Social Research, special issue, Cornel Zwierlein & Beatrice de Graaf (eds.), 'Security and Conspiracy in History, 16th to 21st Century,' 38, no. 143 (2013), 70.

<sup>10</sup> Karl Mannheim, 'The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge', in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, edited by Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1925] 1952), 140.

Mannheim emphasised the difference between showing a doctrine to be false, and undermining the extra-theoretical effectiveness of the doctrine. Unmasking is supposed to undermine the motivating force of beliefs for agents. As he put it in *Ideology and Utopia*, the point of unmasking critique is to destroy an opponent's confidence in her ideas. That is, the point of unmasking is not simply to correct a misunderstanding about some historical event or practice, in the way that various experts might try to correct each others' understandings of the transmission vectors of some new strain of influenza, but rather to influence the consciousness of others by making present to them the real causes of their beliefs. Unlike the sort of debate we might imagine in an idealised academic or scientific setting, unmasking is for Mannheim an inherently political, which is to say, conflictual, practice. Political conflict, as he understands it, is 'a rationalised form of the struggle for social predominance', which involves 'attack[ing] the social status of the opponent, his public prestige, his self-confidence' (Mannheim 1985 [1936]: 35). 'Political discussion is, from the very first, more than theoretical argumentation; it is the tearing off of disguises – the unmasking of those unconscious motives which bind the group existence to its cultural aspirations and its theoretical arguments.'<sup>11</sup>

The similarity between critical theories and conspiracy theories, then, lies in their argumentative structure. They both involve not only a claim to knowledge about the true causes of some phenomenon, but also a moment of unmasking that aims to emancipate the audience from a deception that is itself related to those true causes. This general structural similarity has been quite widely noted,<sup>12</sup> even if it has proven difficult to pin down. As Jodi Dean puts it, 'conspiracy theories are critical theories, critical theories generally misread as empirical theories.'<sup>13</sup> This observation

---

<sup>11</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans., Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt, Inc., [1936] 1985), 35. The English 'unmasking' is usually translated as 'demaskieren' or 'entlarven', but Mannheim uses the term 'Enthuellen', which has connotations of unveiling or uncloaking.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Parker, 'Human Science as Conspiracy Theory,' in *The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences*, ed. Jane Parish and Martin Parker (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 191.

<sup>13</sup> Jodi Dean, 'Theorizing Conspiracy Theory', *Theory & Event* 4, no. 3 (2000).

is, I think, broadly correct. And it is a useful corrective to the idea that conspiracy theories are simply failed attempts at positive or scientific explanation. It means that any account of conspiracy theories needs to take account of their orientation to the emancipation of a public audience. However, it does not take us very far towards understanding what is distinct about conspiracy theories.

## 2. Conspiracy, Collusion and the Invisible Hand

Yet there seems to be at least one very important difference between critical theories and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories purport to unmask secret plots and plotters. Critical theories, however, typically invoke impersonal social forces.<sup>14</sup> As Latour puts it, ‘we in the academy like to use more elevated causes – society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism – while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents.’<sup>15</sup> The implication, which has been made explicit by many commentators on the theme of conspiracy theory, is that by focusing on the malign intentions or designs of particular actors, conspiracy theorists are hopelessly naive. They are said to fall for the ‘fundamental attribution error’, privileging dispositional explanations, which turn on the character and intention of particular actors, over situational, which is to say, environmental or contextual explanations.<sup>16</sup> Conspiracy theorists are captured by the ‘artificer bias’,<sup>17</sup> the tendency to explain apparently ordered outcomes of complex interactions in terms of the intentions or designs of particular actors. Furthermore, such explanations are peculiarly ill-fitted for making sense of a complex, interdependent world. ‘[C]onspiracy theorists,’ Keeley writes, expressing a sentiment that has been common since at least Hofstadter’s essay on the paranoid style,<sup>18</sup> are the last believers in an

<sup>14</sup> It is in part for this reason that some have claimed that critical social thought in general betrays a conspiratorial turn of mind. See Kenneth Minogue, *Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, [1985] 2007).

<sup>15</sup> Latour, ‘Critique,’ 229.

<sup>16</sup> Steve Clarke ‘Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing,’ *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 32 (2003): 131.

<sup>17</sup> Edna Ullmann-Margalit, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations,’ *Synthese* 39 (1978): 269.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Hofstadter, ‘The paranoid style in American politics,’ *Harper’s Magazine* 229, no. 1374 (1964): 77-86.

ordered universe.’<sup>19</sup> The real world, he suggests, simply does not work like that: ‘The world as we understand it today is made up of an extremely large number of interacting agents, each with its own imperfect view of the world and its own set of goals. Such a system cannot be controlled because there are simply too many agents to be handled by any small controlling group. There are too many independent degrees of freedom. This is true of the economy, of the political electorate, and of the very social, fact-gathering institutions upon which conspiracy theorists cast doubt.’<sup>20</sup> By invoking the idea that *some hidden group of people* is directing events, conspiracy theorists avoid confronting a world in which there is typically not a strong correspondence between outcomes and the intentions of any of the people whose interaction produced them. The world simply does not work like that, if it ever did.<sup>21</sup> The emphasis on the causal force of small groups working in secret thus seems to mark the naiveté of the conspiratorial mind.

Taking this intuition a step further, some have explicitly framed conspiracy theory in terms of a dichotomy between ‘hidden hand’ and ‘invisible hand’ explanations. Karl Popper, in one of the early uses of the term ‘conspiracy theory’, framed it against explanations in terms of unintended consequences. Popper defined the ‘conspiracy theory of society’ as ‘the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be

---

<sup>19</sup> Keeley, ‘Of Conspiracy Theories,’ 123.

<sup>20</sup> Keeley, ‘Of Conspiracy Theories,’ 124.

<sup>21</sup> The precise point at which explanations of historical, social and political events in terms of agency and intention came to seem quaint and outmoded is hard to specify. Thomas Haskell, locates a definite shift in the conditions of causal attribution at the end of the 19th century, when the birth of modern social sciences formalized what was by that point a widely shared social experience of a growing distance between individual agency and social effects. See Thomas Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science. The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, [1980] 2000). Gordon Wood focuses on the intellectual forerunners of this shift, and identifies the late 18th century as the period in which - at least among political and intellectual elites - the shift toward the modern mode of explaining social and political reality began to make itself felt. See Gordon Wood, ‘Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century,’ *The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series* 39, no. 3 (1982): 402-441.

revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about.<sup>22</sup> Popper raised the spectre of the ‘conspiracy theory of society’ as a counterpoint to what we might call his *anti-conspiracy theory of society*, in which the patterned order that emerges from the interaction of multiple agents cannot be derived from their individual intentions. Even institutions ‘which arise as the result of conscious and intentional human actions are, as a rule, the indirect, the unintended and often the unwanted by-products of such actions.’<sup>23</sup> However, Popper runs together the idea that actors with common interests may co-ordinate their action in order to secure those interests, and the idea that they must also have made a secret explicit agreement to carry out a plan to that effect. These are two distinct things, which I will discuss below as conspiracy and collusion. But Popper makes it seem that if you point to a common interest in a particular outcome you are also invoking or presupposing a secret plan and plotters – a literal conspiracy. Popper does not explicitly discuss this relation, but his formulation creates what is for him a productive ambiguity, such that anything that was not an invisible hand account looked like some form of ‘conspiracy theory’ of society.

Robert Nozick also invokes a dichotomy between hidden hand and invisible hand explanations, but he does so in a different way. In *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Nozick puts forward an invisible hand argument for the emergence of a dominant protective association, which is to say, a minimal state.<sup>24</sup> He later elaborates on the idea of an invisible hand explanation, which takes an apparently consciously designed institution or pattern and shows how it could have arisen and/or been maintained by the interaction of separate individuals unaware of and not intending the collective effect,

---

<sup>22</sup> Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 5th edition (Abingdon: Routledge Classics, [1945] 2011), 306.

<sup>23</sup> Popper, *Open Society*, 305. In noting the improbability of successful conspiracies, Popper is not saying that real conspiracies are inconsequential or unimportant. Rather, his point is that they are not *typical*, and they cannot therefore be the basis for a social science. Social science, on Popper’s account, presumes a stable, transparent, and predictable institutional framework. The central task of the explanatory social sciences, Popper then proposed, is to analyse and foresee the ‘unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions,’ Popper, *Open Society*, 307.

<sup>24</sup> Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

that is, without any conscious design. A hidden hand explanation, by contrast, takes ‘an apparently unintended, accidental, or unrelated set of events’ and shows them to be the result of intentional design.<sup>25</sup> ‘Hidden hand explanations, the opposite of invisible-hand ones, tend toward ruling class (or, more extremely, conspiracy) theories.’<sup>26</sup> For Nozick, hidden hands and invisible hands explain different things. One explains apparently undesigned and accidental phenomena as the outcome of a secret design; the other explains apparently designed and deliberately ordered phenomena as the accidental outcome of unwitting individual actions. But Nozick misses the fact that hidden hand explanations do more. They also take institutions and patterned orders that appear to be consciously designed and maintained and, in the absence of an obvious designer, impute a hidden design and hidden power that maintains them. The hidden hand may thus be a direct competitor to the invisible hand, an explanation of the same thing: patterned order which looks designed but for which we can find no designer. Invisible hand explanations attempt to show a connection between separate individual actions and collective patterned order where that order is emergent, and thus where the connection between the individual component actions and the collective effects is opaque.

Invisible hand arguments are indeed archetypally anti-conspiratorial, since they reject inference from orderliness and patterned structure to a designer. An invisible hand explanation takes an overall patterned order that looks as though it *could* have been produced according to some design (whether beneficent or malevolent), and explains it not in terms of design, but in terms of the unknowing and unintended interactions of many separate individuals. The invisible hand process is usefully described by Ullmann-Margalit as an ‘aggregate mechanism that takes as “input” the diverse and dispersed actions of numerous individuals, and produces as an “output” an overall structured social pattern –*subject to the assumption that the individuals concerned neither foresee this pattern nor intend to bring it*

---

<sup>25</sup> Robert Nozick, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations,’ *The American Economic Review* 84, no. 2 (1994): 314.

<sup>26</sup> Nozick, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations,’ 316.

*about.*<sup>27</sup> What Ullmann-Margalit's account makes explicit is the importance of the assumption that the actors involved are themselves unwitting accomplices in the collective action: they are, in the invisible hand explanation, 'supposed to be minding their own business, unaware of and ... [therefore] not intending to produce the overall outcome.'<sup>28</sup> One introduction to self-organisation in biological systems makes the same point: 'Self-organisation is a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components of the system. Moreover, *the rules specifying interactions among the system's components are executed using only local information, without reference to the global pattern.* ... emergent properties are features of a system that arise unexpectedly from interactions among the system's components.'<sup>29</sup> I will come back to this point.

However, we should be wary of setting up a dichotomy between 'hidden hand' and 'invisible hand' explanations, not because there is no difference between them, but because there is too much difference between them: the dichotomy overshadows and obscures the variety of forms of collective action that lie between them. If we want a better grasp of the ubiquity of the language of conspiracy in political and social life, and the problematic category of conspiracy theories, we need a clearer account of the spectrum of forms of secret or obscure co-ordination of collective action. To this end I will make a sharper distinction than is common in the literature on conspiracy theories between conspiracy and collusion,<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Edna Ullmann-Margalit, 'The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason,' *Social Research* 64, no. 2 (1997): 190; my italic.

<sup>28</sup> Ullmann-Margalit, 'Invisible-Hand Explanations,' 267.

<sup>29</sup> Scott Camazine, Jean-Louis Deneubourg, Nigel R. Franks, James Sneyd, Guy Theraulaz, & Eric Bonabeau, *Self-Organization in Biological Systems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 8; my italic.

<sup>30</sup> For a notable exception see Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, *On Complicity and Compromise* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). They distinguish between conspiracy, cooperation and collusion as part of a typology of acts involving co-principals. Cooperation involves agents who 'all share the same plan and all share in its execution (albeit in different ways).' They might not have all made the plan, but however it came about, they must be aware of it, 'adopt (it) as their own and orient their behaviour around it.' Cooperators 'act interdependently. They monitor one another's behaviour in pursuit of the plan and adjust their own behaviour accordingly.' While cooperation can be public, collusion is 'secret, implicit rather than explicit, aiming to trick others to the

and highlight the ways in which both are distinguished from invisible hand theories.

A pure conspiracy – a ‘hidden hand’ or ‘smoky room’ room conspiracy – involves explicit agreement among two or more people to do something that is illegal or that they could not publicly avow. This is the archetype of a conspiracy *with* conspirators. It marks the most conspiratorial degree of coordinated collective action. It involves individuals knowingly and explicitly forming a collective intention and, if they are successful, collective action. (As in many legal definitions of conspiracy it is the agreement to commit an act, not the act itself, that constitutes the wrongdoing.) The centrality of oath-taking to the sealing of conspiracies exemplifies this form, since the oath involves an explicit act of consent, binding the group in its collective decision. This is the classic form of the conspiracy, from the gunpowder plot to the 9/11 attacks. I will call this a conspiracy of action, since it turns on an explicit (but secret) agreement to carry out a plan to do something illegal or wrong.

It is perhaps worth distinguishing a sub-type, a conspiracy of deception. Here we have the same explicit agreement to do something wrong, but the ‘something wrong’ involves deceiving the public. In many political contexts, the real occasions in which small groups of people secretly agree to do something wrong are often conspiracies of deception. The archetype of a small group explicitly agreeing a common collective action more commonly applies to the cover-up than it does to the forward-looking direction of complex events. That is, many conspiracies in government are cover-ups of cock-ups. Conspiracies of deception are located in the dimension of public communication and are evidenced by hypocrisy, double-talk, deception, dissimulation, insincerity, and obscurity. Much of the conspiracy-talk in contemporary democracies seems to invoke conspiracies of deception, which is to say, it focuses more on signs of concealment and deception than on the coherence or plausibility of the

---

mutual benefit of each colluder.’ The acts are open, but that they are part of a joint plan is secret. See Lepora and Goodin, *On Complicity*, 38-9.

supposed plot itself. Watergate, for instance, was crucially about a cover-up and a sequence of 'shabby deceits'.<sup>31</sup>

Conspiracy in both these cases turns on the existence of an explicit, though secret, agreement to do something wrong. By contrast, collusion, as I am defining the term here, involves an association bound in a common interest against a wider public interest by a tacit, and therefore hidden, agreement. Consider the example of oligopoly, where a small group of producers maintains a monopoly price because each can see that if they increased their own output to grab a little more market share, their competitors would be forced to do likewise, and they would all quickly have to settle for a new lower price and the same distribution of market share – an outcome none of them wants. The invisible hand explanation requires that the agents involved neither foresee nor intend the patterned order that emerges from their action. Oligopoly, however, describes a situation in which participants *can* foresee a particular outcome, and act accordingly. They can foresee the outcome to the extent that they can recognise their interdependence. Yet they need not make an *explicit* agreement. What seems to be involved, rather, is tacit agreement, that is, an agreement that is sealed by the absence of objection, or in this case, defection. While both the aggregative invisible hand and the hidden hand arguments give accounts of the *emergence* at a particular moment in time of a particular structured social pattern, the co-ordination of action through tacit agreement addresses the maintenance of a particular pattern, and it is revealed only over time. This sense of the term conspiracy is hardly new. When Adam Smith observed that 'people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices',<sup>32</sup> he is talking about what I am calling collusion. The 'conspiracists' are not literally plotting together, not making an explicit agreement. But, in Smith's view, they naturally co-ordinated

---

<sup>31</sup> Sisela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 173.

<sup>32</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd, Glasgow edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, [1776] 1981), I.x.ii.27.

their behaviour in their common interest and against the public interest.

Collusion thus represents a conspiracy without conspirators; people co-ordinating their action without necessarily needing to be told. This shares with conspiracy in the strict sense the presence of an association bound in a common interest against a wider public interest. However, the agreement by which they are bound is tacit rather than secret.<sup>33</sup> Thus, unmasking this sort of co-ordination does not involve revealing a plot, since there is no plot, no explicit agreement. Rather, it involves revealing a common interest, and revealing the interdependence of actors and thus showing why it would be rational for them to contribute to the collective action. As Richard Tuck has observed, it is this sort of collusion that is made to seem impossible by Mancur Olson's account of the rationality of collective action.<sup>34</sup> Olson's lesson is that wherever there is co-ordinated collective action among a large group there must be an organisation capable of coercing and incentivising its members to keep them from taking a free ride on the efforts of the rest of the group. If you point to the apparently co-ordinated action of a large group of actors with a common interest in an outcome, you will be expected to also identify the organisation with the resources to keep everyone on board with carrots and sticks, punishment of defectors and so on. If such an organisation is not evident, you will be

---

<sup>33</sup> There is some ambiguity here between secrecy and opacity - that is, whether an agreement is being actively hidden or is simply obscure or hard to see. The hidden hand argument invokes an explicit, but secret, agreement. The invisible hand explanation involves obscurity, though not secrecy, in the relation between the separate actions and the emergent collective phenomenon. The paradigmatic examples of invisible hand explanations involve social institutions or patterns with a 'structure', 'difference in type' and 'degree of complexity,' where the connection between the individual actions and the collective effects is *opaque*. See Ullmann-Margalit, 'Invisible Hand Explanations,' 267. In the realm of collusion, the visibility of the connections between individual actions and collective effects is key, because it is only if the actors recognize their interdependence that it can be inferred that they are coordinating their behaviour.

<sup>34</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

accused of necessarily presupposing a secret organisation. You will start to look like a conspiracy theorist.<sup>35</sup>

This account of collusion as a conspiracy without conspirators may seem a long way from the stereotype of the plotters in a ‘smoky room’, but it is surprisingly common in accounts of conspiracy theory. For instance, Stephan Lewandowsky, a leading figure in the study of the psychology of conspiracy theories, defines conspiratorial thinking, or ‘conspiracist ideation’, as ‘the attempt to explain a significant political or social event as a secret plot by powerful individuals or organisations.’<sup>36</sup> However, he immediately follows this definition with an example that is, in my terms, collusion, a conspiracy without conspirators, where the ‘secret plot’ seems in fact to be rather more like a hidden tacit agreement. His example of a conspiracy theory is the way that tobacco companies imagined their opponents in what they called the ‘anti-smoking industry’. Scientists doing medical research on the effects of smoking were, in the words of one internal tobacco industry report, part of a ‘vertically integrated, highly concentrated, oligopolistic cartel... [that] manufactures alleged evidence, suggestive inferences linking smoking to various diseases, and publicity and dissemination and advertising of these so-called findings to the widest possible public.’<sup>37</sup> The original document does not use the term ‘conspiracy’, but Lewandowsky and colleagues have no trouble identifying it as an example of a conspiracy theory, because it invokes the idea of coordinated collective action by people who both foresee and

---

<sup>35</sup> Richard Tuck, by contrast, argues that the instrumentally rational person will support an organisation that works in his interest, and for exactly the reason Olson dismisses - because he knows that the argument that would support his defection would equally support the defection of others, and for this reason they can rely on him and he on them to maintain the organisation. He claims that it is ‘rational for agents who share a common purpose to collaborate,’ and that it is irrational ‘to value an outcome and not to wish to contribute to it.’ See Richard Tuck, *Free Riding* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 177; 192. Tuck’s argument bears on the conspiracy problem in that it suggests the ubiquity of forms of collective action that are neither entirely emergent (invisible-hand) nor involve explicit agreements.

<sup>36</sup> Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer, and Gilles Gignac. ‘Nasa Faked the Moon Landing—Therefore (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science,’ *Psychological Science* 5 (2013): 623.

<sup>37</sup> C. C. Abt, ‘The Anti-Smoking Industry,’ (1983): 126-7. Available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vob81f00>, accessed July 27, 2014.

intend the outcome of their separate actions, even though there was no secret smoky room in which they sealed the agreement.

### 3. Climate Conspiracies

With these distinctions in mind let us consider some actual examples of talk about conspiracies and conspiracy theories, examples which I take from recent debates about climate change and climate science. The climate change case provides a number of examples in which critics on both sides explicitly use the term ‘conspiracy’, such as US Senator James Inhofe’s book, *The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future*, or *The Greenhouse Conspiracy*, a Channel 4 documentary broadcast in 1990.<sup>38</sup> But what do they mean by conspiracy? And what are they doing when they claim to unmask it?

#### *Hidden Hands (style?)*

We might think that the most common sort of conspiracy invoked is the classic ‘hidden hand’. Consider the following example. Under the headline ‘A Major Deception on Global Warming’, Fred Seitz, a physicist who had been involved in government policy during the cold war and was close to the then Bush administration, wrote an open letter to the *Wall Street Journal* on the occasion of the publication of the second IPCC report, and in particular in reference to Chapter 8 of that report, which contained the claim that ‘[T]he balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.’<sup>39</sup> Writing in the *Wall Street Journal* on 12 June 1996, Seitz charged that

‘this report is not what it appears to be – it is not the version that was approved by the contributing scientists listed on the title page. In my more than 60 years as a member of the American scientific community, including service as president of both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Physical Society, I have

---

<sup>38</sup> See James Inhofe, *The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future* (Washington DC: WND Books, 2012). *The Greenhouse Conspiracy* was a Channel 4 Documentary (for their Equinox series), broadcast in the UK on 12 August 1990.

<sup>39</sup> Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, *Merchants of Doubt. How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 205.

never witnessed a more disturbing corruption of the peer-review process than the events that led to this IPCC report’.

Following a rebuttal from the members of the IPCC panel who were being accused of corruption, Seitz wrote a follow up letter to the *Wall Street Journal* on 11 July 1996, in which he conceded:

‘Of course [IPCC procedures require changes in response to comments], but not after the governments have accepted the final draft. The fact is that someone connected with the presentation of the published version, presumably Dr Santer and others, rewrote basic technical material in Chapter 8 with the result that scientific doubts about man-made global warming were suppressed.’

This seems to invoke a hidden hand. Mayanna Lahsen, for instance, thinks that Seitz ‘evokes conspiracy’ with the ‘vague’ term ‘someone connected with’. From the word ‘revealed’, and the term ‘tampered with for political purposes’, she finds ‘even stronger suggestions of secretive plotting and corruption’.<sup>40</sup> She notes his reference to IPCC officials ‘quoted (but not named)’ in a *Nature* article as conjuring hidden actors. Seitz charged that lead author Ben Santer ‘and possibly others’ made the changes. This is ‘subtle but pervasive accusatory rhetoric, suggesting secrecy, conspiracy, and repression’.<sup>41</sup>

The more recent ‘climate-gate’ controversy also invokes the imagery of conspiracy in terms of hidden hands.<sup>42</sup> The term ‘climate-gate’ was coined by James Delingpole of the UK

---

<sup>40</sup> Myanna Lahsen, ‘The Detection and Attribution of Conspiracies: The Controversy Over Chapter 8,’ in *Paranoia Within Reason: A Casebook on Conspiracy as Explanation*, edited by George E. Marcus (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 126.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>42</sup> I focus here on the charges of conspiracy and conspiracy theory. See also Brett Jacob Bricker, ‘Climategate: A Case Study in the Intersection of Facticity and Conspiracy Theory,’ *Communication Studies* 64, no. 2 (2013): 218-239. For extensive reviews of the details and substance of these claims and counter-claims in the climate debate, see Oreskes and Conway, *Merchants*, on one side, and on the other A. W. Montford, *The Hockey Stick Illusion* (London: Stacey International, 2010).

newspaper the *Daily Telegraph*, and it explicitly invoked conspiratorial imagery. 'The conspiracy behind the Anthropogenic Global Warming myth ... has been suddenly, brutally and quite deliciously exposed after a hacker broke into the computers at the University of East Anglia's Climate Research Unit... and released 61 megabytes of confidential files onto the internet.'<sup>43</sup> Behind the apparent scientific consensus, it seemed, was a plot to suppress dissent. Critics claim to have plucked the mask of consensus from the face of climate science. They treated the emails as a glimpse behind the veil, as evidence that behind the apparent consensus on climate science lay a conspiracy of scientists suppressing uncomfortable data and attempting to manipulate the peer review process. David Holland, who made several of the FOIA requests to the CRU, claimed in evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee that:

*'The emails show that a group of influential climate scientists colluded to subvert the peer-review process of the IPCC and science journals, and thereby delay or prevent the publication and assessment of research by scientists who disagreed with the group's conclusions about global warming. They manufactured pre-determined conclusions through the corruption of the IPCC process and deleted procedural and other information hoping to avoid its disclosure under freedom-of-information requests.'*<sup>44</sup>

Although it is not clear from this quote whether Holland treats 'collusion' and 'conspiracy' as the same thing, he does claim that scientists were acting together to suppress unwanted findings and to 'manufacture pre-determined conclusions'. And the email scandal more generally fits the pattern of a method of political interpretation that places heavy emphasis on the secret document as a revelation of hidden intent. In a sense, the whole point of the email scandal was that it was

---

<sup>43</sup> <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/100017393/climategate-the-final-nail-in-the-coffin-of-anthropogenic-global-warming/>, accessed 29 July 2014.

<sup>44</sup> House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, *The disclosure of climate data from the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, Eighth Report of Session*, (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2009–10), 22; my italic.

taken to reveal an explicit but secret agreement, a classic conspiracy.

*Conspiracies of Optimism and Pessimism (STYLE)?*

The suppression of dissent of the sort invoked by critics in the wake of ‘climate-gate’ need not, however, result from explicit agreement. A number of conspiratorial accounts of what lies behind the consensus on climate change – on both sides – turn on claims of ‘organised efforts to keep unfavourable evidence from coming to public attention and/or to undermine its legitimacy,’<sup>45</sup> where the ‘organised effort’ need not necessarily be an actual, explicit secret plot. Thus, it is often suggested by climate critics that pessimistic projections of climate change are driven – without explicit agreement or a smoky room – by climate scientists’ disciplinary biases, institutional interests and ideological preferences.<sup>46</sup> And on the other side, it is charged that interest groups opposed to the main climate change mitigation policies covertly attempt to distort the assessment of the science of climate change in order to forestall political action. The structure of this process has been described by Hirt as a ‘conspiracy of optimism’. Hirt introduces the idea of a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ as part of an attempt to explain why forestry managers in America in the post-war period made over-optimistic scientific assessments of future yields and ended up pursuing policies that undermined their own claims of sustainability (though, of course, whether it counts as ‘optimism’ or ‘pessimism’ depends on your point of view). ‘This was not a conscious, manipulative conspiracy of self-servers,’ he writes. Rather, ‘well-meaning, public-spirited individuals’ ended up with systematically biased scientific assessments as a result of an array of ‘political and organisational pressures to maximise production.’<sup>47</sup> He

---

<sup>45</sup> William R. Freudenburg and Violetta Muselli, ‘Reexamining Climate Change Debates: Scientific Disagreement or Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods (SCAMs)?,’ *American Behavioural Scientist* 57, no. 6 (2013): 782.

<sup>46</sup> For a typical example of this sort of criticism of the problem of climate change, see James Delingpole, *Watermelons: How Environmentalists are Killing the Planet, Destroying the Economy and Stealing your Children's Future* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2012). Richard Bean’s 2011 play ‘The Heretic’ presents a similar account of a conspiracy of pessimism in climate science.

<sup>47</sup> Paul W. Hirt, *A conspiracy of optimism: Management of the national forests since World War Two* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), xxxii; xliii.

suggests that at least some participants in this process were aware of what they were doing (and were secretly pursuing a partial interest at odds with the ostensible common goal of sustainability), but most were simply operating within a complex system with little awareness of the possible biases that were creeping into their work.

This argument has been taken up in the context of the climate debates by Freudenburg and Muselli, who suggest that the scientific consensus on future projections of climate change is being systematically skewed in an optimistic direction. They focus in particular on the mechanism of 'selective challenges' to scientific evidence.<sup>48</sup> The idea is that when the most vigorous challenge to scientific evidence comes mostly from one direction – when, for instance, studies that yield higher estimates of the levels of harmful environmental pollutants effects—of are subject to more frequent, skilful and vigorous challenge than those that suggest lower levels – then what will be taken as the 'scientific consensus' will have as a net result a pattern of collective bias. This collective bias is not a matter of 'individual prejudice', but rather of 'systematic error'.<sup>49</sup> Selective challenges, and the resulting systematic error, are an important phenomenon. It suggests that where funding from research comes from organisations or interests that push in one direction, then one can expect –without any explicit co-ordination or decision – results that amount to systematic error. Thus 'the actual pattern of systematic error [in what is taken to be the scientific consensus] is likely to be *precisely the opposite* of the one presented in the mass media, which is 'dominated by assertions that the IPCC and other scientists are biased towards overstating the available evidence' (Freudenburg et al. 2013: 784). Rather, the vigorous promotion of criticism of only the pessimistic research skews the resulting scientific consensus in favour

---

<sup>48</sup> They build on a line of research in 'selective challenges' to scientific research. See also T. Dietz, P. C. Stern, & R. W. Rycroft, 'Definitions of conflict and the legitimization of resources: The case of environmental risk,' *Sociological Forum* 4, no. 1 (1989): 47-70; Sheldon Krinsky, *Hormonal chaos: The scientific and social origins of the environmental endocrine hypothesis* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); B. Martin, 'Suppression of dissent in science,' *Research in Social Problems and Public Policy* 7 (1999): 105–135; and David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, 'A 'gift of God'? The public health controversy over leaded gasoline during the 1920s,' *American Journal of Public Health* 75, no. 4 (1985): 344–352.

<sup>49</sup> Freudenburg and Muselli, 'Scientific Disagreement,' 784.

of those who would prefer that climate change did not look like a serious problem.

What is being unmasked here is not a hidden hand or the 'smoking gun' of emails in which the strategy is decided and agreed upon. Rather, what is being revealed is the interdependence and patterned order that may be unwittingly produced by the actors involved. There are varying degrees of complicity in the production of a given patterned order such as a 'conspiracy of optimism'. Some actors may be well aware of the collective effect of their actions. For those who wish to play down the extent of climate change, for instance, such 'selective challenge', is part of the playbook. Indeed, Freudenburg et al suggest, this strategy turns out to be cheaper and more effective than funding spurious research, and has much the same effect on the resulting scientific consensus. But others are unwitting accomplices. Unmasking conspiracies, then, may not always be simply a matter of revealing a plot, a hidden hand controlling events. Rather, it may also involve revealing the complicity of many other actors in the production of patterned order at a collective level.

For another example of the way in which conspiracy and collusion may be combined in practice, consider Lord Monckton, a former advisor to the Thatcher government and an avid critic of climate science. Lord Monckton tells a story about the rise of climate change as a public problem that sounds a lot like a conspiracy theory, in which 'the left' became allied with science to promote a secret agenda 'to shut down the economies of the West'. The left's association with science was a product of the cold war. More than that, he says, it was a plot. When the Soviets realised that they could not compete with capitalist economies, they plotted to destroy the West by attacking its energy infrastructure. 'I've been told that the left, the KGB, realised that energy was the soft underbelly of the West. ... They used twin attacks via the working classes and the environment movement. They thought, 'That's how we destroy the economies of the West.'" The cold war may have ended some time ago, but the left remains a perilous threat: 'Once they had been motivated in these directions by the Communists, then these organisations took on a life of their own. ... They are essentially still following the KGB playbook without being

aware that they're doing so. It's absolutely the same pattern.<sup>50</sup>

Monckton is interesting because he explains origins of the climate conspiracy in an actual plot by the KGB, but explains the persistence of the conspiracy without any further intentional co-ordination at all. His story looks like an archetype of a conspiratorial narrative, claiming that climate change science is a hoax concocted by left-wing scientists in order to promote the case for a global government, and yet he freely admits that this claim does not require that any of these scientists or leftists have an explicit agreement to co-ordinate their action to that end, or even that they individually intend it. His story has an account of origins or emergence – and here we have the explicit conspiratorial figures, in the form of the KGB infiltrating left-wing militants and environmental movements of the West – and an account of the persistence of the conspiracy in terms of interests and the social function of beliefs – the idea that *whether or not anybody is explicitly plotting* the coalition of climate change advocates are co-ordinated by a common interest bringing about a global government and undermining the energy infrastructure of the West. The hidden agenda can be hidden from the actors themselves.

#### 4. Conclusion: Between the Hidden Hand and the Invisible Hand

A long line of commentators on conspiracy theories have, following Popper, invoked a sharp contrast between the naive agent-centred logic of a 'hidden hand' theory and the sophisticated 'invisible hand' model of collective effects as the outcome of human actions but not of human designs. This crude contrast, however, obscures the forms of co-ordinated collective action that fall between the two poles. Between the hidden hand and the invisible hand there are forms of co-ordination that involve intention but not (necessarily) explicit agreement. It is here that we can usefully separate out the sort of conspiracy involving a plot from the sort of collusion revealed by identifying interdependence and common interests. To the extent that

---

<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Will Storr, *The Heretics: Adventures with the Enemies of Science* (Basingstoke and Oxford: Picador, 2013), 260.

the actors involved *are aware of and intend* the collective effect – even if they do not explicitly agree – we might say they are involved in a conspiracy without conspirators. In the realm of conspiracies without conspirators, the visibility of the connections between individual actions and collective effects is key, because it is only if the actors recognise their interdependence that it can be inferred that they are co-ordinating their behaviour. Arguments about conspiracy and conspiracy theory are in this sense public arguments about agency, intention and their collective effects.

If conspiracies themselves, as I have suggested, can involve a spectrum of different degrees of agreement, then conspiracy theory too is a spectrum disorder. There may be individuals who hold something like the strongest version of the hidden hand argument, and truly believe that the widest range of outcomes of complex systems are in fact controlled and directed by a mysterious and hidden agency. Yet, I think, many more of the cases of conspiracy and conspiracy-theory talk do not involve a literal accusation that there are plotters somewhere in a smoky room, but rather involve something more like the conspiracy without conspirators that I have described in this paper. Unmasking conspiracies, then, involves more than just revealing the plots of ‘greedy people with dark intents’, as Latour puts it.<sup>51</sup> It involves unmasking complicity in the production of collective effects that can be both foreseen and, to the extent that they are foreseen, intended. In this respect, conspiracy and critique may be a little closer than Latour suggests.

---

<sup>51</sup> Latour, ‘Critique,’ 229-30.